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The Analysis of Non-Financial Qualitative
Factors for Corporate Value Creation
Syed Umar Farooq
Allama Iqbal Open University, Islamabad, Pakistan
ABSTRACT
Interviews conducted with the major KSE (Karachi Stock Exchange) Fund Managers
revealed that they all faced problem of ignorance and uncertainty in stock selection
and in asset allocation decision. The problems were due, in part, to the limitations of
finance theory and the limitations of corporate disclosures and other public domain
information sources. These problems increased fund manager’s incentives to directly
contact senior management teams to discuss these sources of value and to observe
management qualities and understanding of these issues. Fund managers sought to
identify links between these qualitative factors in a corporate value creation process.
This paper explores how this information was used by fund managers to acquire a
knowledge advantage. This activity of fund managers has important implications for
regulatory policy issues on insider information, on corporate disclosure, on the
corporate governance role of financial institutions, and for the governance of the
institutions.
INTRODUCTION

I

n section 1, we explore how major KSE fund managers faced problems in stock
selection and in asset allocation decision. Than we will see how fund manager directly
contacted senior management teams to discuss concrete and intangible sources of value.
We explore how the fund managers identified the many qualitative components of the
corporate value creation process.
Research Method
Interviews were conducted with 20 Fund Managers during the period of January 2005
and April 2006. Each fund manager case participant had the interview questions for at
least a month before the interview.
The interview case data revealed many different themes concerning financial institution
information collection from their investor companies and significance for fund management.
These themes have been identified through a Glaser and Strauss (1967) ‘grounded
theory’, approach to the case data. The interview case data formed the basis for identifying
common patterns and themes across the cases. Generalizations have been restricted to
the cases studied.
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Public information sources for fund managers: Company and sector level
In this section, we explore how the case fund managers faced problems of ignorance
and uncertainty in stock selection and in asset allocation decisions. These problems
were due, in part, to the limitations of corporate disclosures and of other public domain
information sources. Associated problems also arose for the case fund managers
because of major difficulties in implementing modern portfolio and aspects of finance
theory in fund management decision. These problems with public information sources
and with the conceptual framework for fund management were a major stimulus for
creating structured fund management decision processes to cope with uncertainty and
ignorance and a strong incentive to acquire private information directly from companies.
Public sources of information included company announcements and financial results
as well as government announcements. Major sources of fund managers’ information
were the brokers through which the fund managers bought and sold shares. The main
broker houses were Taurus Securities, KASB Securities, Invest Cap, Saleem Chamdia
Securities and First National Equities. Fund managers faced a major problem in that
all of the major information and data suppliers provided historic, mainly public domain
information. They also provided software to analyze this data and establish summary
statistics. The fundamental problem with these public sources was that the information
was perceived as already being in the price, with the price change not necessarily
indicating the nature of the event or information.
The case fund managers argued that they needed a special information edge for fund
management roles and this was unlikely to be found with financial reports, public
announcements, public domain analyst reports on companies and other public sources.
As a result, the limitations of public sources provided the fund managers with strong
incentives to develop private corporate sources of information. However, despite the
limitations of public sources of information, they play a central role in fund management
because they form the primary sources of financial and quantitative information about
corporate performance and focus on well established financial output measures.
Stopford (1997) argues that the fusion of the information age with traditional industries
has been a primary driver of innovation. This has increased the ability of companies
to change the rules of competition and the chances of corporate failure. As intangibles
such as knowledge and innovation have become an increasingly important part of
corporate value then this has exacerbated to the problem of how to disclose the value
of these assets on the balance sheet and how to explain the manner in which profits
arise from such intangibles. These problems of financial reporting of intangibles have
increased the information asymmetry between users and suppliers of equity risk capital.
PROBLEM OF IMPLEMENTING FINANCE THEORY
The case fund managers faced major problems in implementing finance theory,
especially with the CAPM when estimating stock returns and when using optimization
routines to find the efficient frontier and the optimum risk, return portfolio. The
problems arose, in part, because of the limitations of public domain data and because
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of the uncertainty implicit in forecasting stock risk and return characteristics. These
problems also arose because of the main controversies and fundamental problems facing
finance theorists. Markowitz (1952) laid the foundations of modern portfolio theory. He
stated that investors seek a risk/return trade off by seeking to maximize returns for a
given level of risk or to minimize risk for a given level of return. This information could
be used to generate a large number of feasible portfolios which were dominated by a
smaller number of efficient risk/return portfolios lying on the efficient frontier.
Risk averse rational portfolio managers could choose one of the portfolios to reflect
their or their clients’ risk/return preferences (utility). Given the input data, the portfolio
selection problem could be solved to find the optimal solution using a quadratic
programming approach. This approach was further simplified by the development of
the CAMP by Sharpe and Lintner in the 1960’s. They identified a single factor, linear
model, with which a company’s Beta measured the stock’s return volatility relative
to that of the overall market. Markowitz further argued that finance theory tells us
what is to be estimated in the form of future risk and return and how estimates for
specific shares are to be combined to form estimates for the portfolios as a whole.
However, theory does not tell us how to make the estimates of return, variance and
covariance. Markowitz pointed out the controversy regarding which measure of risk
to employ. In particular there has been a major academic dispute in the empirical
validity of the CAPM and of betas in determining security returns and prices.
Given these theoretical difficulties, none of the case fund managers felt they could
construct a portfolio with the ideal risk/return tradeoff and diversification risk benefits
envisaged by theory. Finding a stable efficient frontier was problematic in this context.
Despite these problems with modern portfolio theory, the existing theory provided the
sole conceptual guide for fund managers in their difficult asset allocation and stock
selection decisions.
VARIETY IN THE FUND MANAGER’S SAMPLE
One conclusion we can derive from this is that whilst theorists and empiricists continue
to improve theoretical framework, the best practitioners can do is to recognize these
theory limitations and to draw on the best insights of theory to guide their decisions.
The case fund managers divided in terms of quantitative (strong use of quantitative
(QM) aspects of theory) versus qualitative preferences. Major factors here were fund
managers’ judgments as to the credibility of the numbers used in the QM approach,
the weight of evidence for and against theoretical approaches, as well as personal
decision style preferences.
For the quantitative case fund managers (16 FM’s), public domain information on
share prices provided the means to calculate historic average returns, variance,
covariance and market weightings. Public domain sources such as financial reports,
corporate disclosure and future looking data such as analysts’ earning forecasts were
important means to adapt these historic figures to estimate future returns, variances,
covariance and weightings.
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In qualitative fund management (24 FM’s) the view was taken that modern finance
theory was too difficult to implement given information problems and time constraints.
Portfolio theory and diversification benefits were accepted but constrained asset
allocation optimization techniques were not. Public domain information on sectors
and major companies were combined with macro economic forecasts to arrive at asset
allocation decision within a more judgmental and intuitive collective decision process.
These fund managers also recognized that their judgmental skills were unlikely to
produce above average performance on the basis of public domain information alone.
INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL AND THE UNIQUE PRIVATE AGENDA
The unique private information agenda consisted of, in part, a very different information
agenda as compared to that employed for the public channels. A key part of private
agenda was a dialogue about public information sources, especially quantitative
financial information sources such as the financial report. In contrast, the unique
private agenda included information on qualitative, non financial company variables
such as quality of management, strategy and its coherence, investment and financing
plans, recent changes in these and in corporate succession and management style.
Information on competitors and the structure of competition was very important. Other
information sources here included a supportive company climate for innovation and
long term investment in productive and human assets, R&D; Expenditure, flexibility
of company to technological change and the role of internal financial resources.
They also used ideas of human capital such as management’s track record in dealing
with risk over time as an important source of information on risk management
capabilities. Both forms of structural and human capital revealed much about corporate
attitude to risk, as well as corporate responsiveness to financial and business risk and
hence corporate vulnerability. The case fund managers ensured against high risk
management teams by preferring to invest in companies that adapted to good financial
risk management practices. They preferred good financial risk practice companies
because they perceived that the information asymmetry they faced in company financial
risk and risk management was extensive.
The regular interaction of the case fund managers with various portfolio companies
shows that the fund managers were in a unique position to learn how elements of
structural capital, such as strategy and board structure, the character of innovation and
various management practices, all interacted with elements of human capital such as
management quality, to contribute to good financial performance in different ways
across diverse companies and industries. They could also observe the collective effect
of these variables on financial performance and share prices. This provided the means
for fund managers to develop a knowledge advantage concerning these qualitative
factors and variables in the corporate value creation process.
Once the case fund managers acquired knowledge advantage concerning the corporate
value creation process, they were in a position to analyze macro and competitive
changes in the company’s environment and to assess their effect on the company and
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the likely corporate response. This in turn provided the means to estimate corporate
returns, their risk vulnerability and corporate value. In order to determine if the fund
managers have an information advantage, the case fund managers argued that, if they
had secured unique information, their company valuation was likely to be superior to
that prevailing in the market place. This belief was not necessarily based on some idea
of market inefficiency.
Fund managers did not believe that the market was full form or strong form efficient.
Rather, they argued that the information gap between semi strong and strong form was
significant and that this gap provided a major incentive for a huge and active market
for information. They therefore tried to gain two advantages. The first was to gain
access to private company information. The second was to develop unique skills in
processing both private and public sources of information. Keane (Stock Market
Efficiency, 1983) refers to these as information and processing advantages.
Relationship sources of information were likely to be somewhat different in publicly
available sources of data. They provided information that was more timely and close
to the return and risk generating process than the current public domain data. They
also provided novel insights into many intangibles concerning corporate risk, including
management attitude to risk, and management capability to risk management.
Additionally, they provided new information on risk that was not generally available.
The private information appeared to be different in character to publicly available
information in that it emphasized qualitative, difficult to observer aspects of the risk
and return generating process and the risk management process. This included
information on intellectual capital factors such as the qualities of the management
team, their understanding of strategy, their impact on the risk and returns generating
process, their attitudes to risk and track record in handling risk.
USE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION IN TOP-DOWN AND BOTTOM-UP RISK
CONTROL
The private insight into the risk, risk management and risk attitudes was used to
manage risk in a bottom up manner as well as top down manner expounded by
conventional portfolio theory. More specifically, fund managers used direct contact
with relationship companies to identify high risk, low return companies and to drop
them out of their portfolios. In the majority of fund managers’ cases, mean-variance
and optimization approaches were either not employed or were only used as a
supplementary source of information at the top down level. The majority of these
qualitative fund managers argued that at various times, they found themselves either
too information constrained, or too ignorant, to find robust and stable optimal portfolio
solutions for the future concerns. A small number of them also argued that experience
and intuition alone were much better guides than these quantitative models.
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CONCLUSIONS
This paper has explored how fund managers deal with major problems of ignorance and
uncertainty in stock selection and in asset allocation decisions. These problems arose
due to the limitations of public domain information sources, but they were exacerbated
by an increasing intellectual capital and intangible components to share prices. As a
result, the case fund managers used private meeting with company management to
understand how value arose through intangibles as well as through tangible assets. The
case data revealed the nature of this private information agenda concerning intellectual
capital or intangibles and the dynamic connections between these variables in the value
creation process. This private information was combined with public sources to create
a knowledge advantage within case fund management teams. It was found that the
learning and knowledge advantages played a central role in framing fund managers’
perceptions of corporate gains, losses and risks. The knowledge advantage and prior
framing were used by fund managers to estimate future corporate performance variables
to evaluate the company. The case data thus provided some insight into how the book
value and market value gap arose and the special role of information on intangibles and
intellectual capital in valuing the company. Private information, the knowledge advantage
and prior framing were also key inputs to bottom up and top down portfolio risk control
and asset allocation by fund managers. The private information sources were used to
remove the poor performance from the portfolio. In addition, they were used to understand
which companies and sectors were likely to be winners and losers under forecast macro
conditions. Both bottom up and top down risk controls were expected to boost fund
performance. This fund management behavior has important implications for regulatory
policy issues on insider information, the corporate disclosure, the corporate governance
role of financial institutions and for the governance of financial institutions. In the case
of insider information, the fund managers were clearly acquiring an inside knowledge
advantage through their regular direct contact with companies.
Finally, we need to ask the following questions. Should the market information benefits
arising from fund manager being informed in this private way about intangibles, be
restricted in the interest of fairness to small investors in financial markets? Secondly,
can the private disclosure process offer ideas on how to improve the public disclosure
process? Thirdly, should the informed fund managers be asked to pursue wider governance
aims in the interests of many savers, stakeholders and the public at large? Finally, in
connection with the larger issue of governance, we must talk: who governs the directors?
These questions are likely to become more urgent in the knowledge decades ahead as
the information asymmetry based on intangibles becomes acute and an increasingly
concentrated and global fund management industry continues to exploit knowledge and
power in the interest of favored groups of savers and shareholders.
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Everyone would like to be the best, but most organizations lack the discipline to
figure out with egoless clarity what they can be the best at and the will to do
whatever it takes to turn that potential into reality. They lack the discipline to rinse
cottage cheese. Jim Collins
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